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People are often ignorant about the legal rules that govern the 
most common transactions in their lives.
1 Whether purchasing 
products and services, leasing real estate, obtaining credit, or finding 
employment, lay people seem to have a fairly poor grasp of even the 
most basic legal principles. Of course, our ignorance usually causes 
no harm. We buy what we need, pay back our loans, and work until 
retirement without becoming embroiled in a legal dispute. But 
sometimes parties involved in conflicts over defective products, loan 
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1 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE  DISPUTES 144-45 (1991) (reviewing evidence of legal ignorance in 
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defaults, or employment terminations  must  assert legal rights or 
defenses, and some of them ultimately resort to litigation. In these 
circumstances, it is undeniable that having too little legal knowledge 
can hurt you.  Legal ignorance  potentially  distorts important 
economic decisions, leading consumers to purchase unreliable or 
unsafe products, borrowers to accept harsh credit terms, or 
employees to rely on illusory promises of job security. 
This article analyzes one regulatory response to our widespread 
legal ignorance. It explores how the law encourages legally 
sophisticated parties to provide legal information to the 
comparatively poorly informed individuals with whom they d o 
business.  I begin by introducing the concept of an “information-
forcing” default rule. Then I show how that concept applies to the 
problem of legal ignorance.
2 The remainder of the article explores a 
variety of theoretical and empirical difficulties that afflict the use of 
information-forcing rules to dispel legal ignorance. 
I. THE PERVASIVENESS OF INFORMATION-FORCING JUSTIFICATIONS 
In this Part, I explain the origins of information-forcing contract 
default rules, extend the basic theory to encompass problems of 
legal ignorance, and illustrate how pervasively courts and 
legislatures have embraced information-forcing arguments. 
A. Origins 
So what precisely is an information-forcing rule? As I will use 
the term, it is any contract default rule that favors one party in order 
to induce  the other party to a transaction to disclose  particular 
information.  If the disfavored party fails to provide the targeted 
information, then that party suffers a legal disadvantage associated 
with the unfavorable default rule. By providing legally adequate 
 
 
2 For an earlier suggestion  that certain employment contract doctrines 
might serve an information-forcing function, see J. Hoult Verkerke,  An 
Empirical Perspective Employment Contract Practices: Resolving the Just 
Cause Debate, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 837, ___. 
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disclosure to a transactional partner, however, the party may escape 
the undesirable default. This definition thus excludes any law that 
requires a party to disclose specific information and imposes civil or 
criminal penalties for nondisclosure.
3 Such affirmative disclosure 
duties serve a similar  purpose, but operate through a different 
mechanism.  My focus here is on situations in which  disclosing 
parties may opt into different and more favorable rules by providing 
the required information to their transactional partner. As we will 
see, even this d efinition embraces a plethora of  judge-made and 
legislatively enacted rules found in diverse substantive areas of law.
4 
Although the rules themselves have been around for a long time, 
academic attention to  the theory of  information-forcing rules 
originated among economically oriented  commentators  examining 
what is now  one of the most thoroughly debated  contract 
doctrines—the foreseeability limitation on consequential damages.
5 
Among contemporary contracts scholars, the canonical justification 
for limiting the recovery of consequential damages to those that are 
foreseeable in the ordinary course of business is an information-
forcing rationale.
6 According to this approach, courts presume that 
both parties know the ordinary damages that will flow from a breach 
of contract.  If, h owever, “special circumstances” w ill produce 
greater than ordinary damages, then the party who knows those 
circumstances must share that information with the other party prior 
to contracting. Only after obtaining at least implied consent to bear 
this additional risk can the better-informed party hope to recover for 
more than ordinary losses in the event of a contract breach.
7 Thus, a 
 
 
3  Examples of direct disclosure duties include SEC prospectus 
requirements, FDA food labeling regulations, and ERISA’s rules requiring plan 
sponsors to provide summary plan descriptions to participants. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
5 For the rule, see Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Court of 
Exchequer, 1854). For the debate, see, e.g., Ayres & Gertner; Jason Johnston, 
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 
YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Barry Adler; others. 
6 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4. 
7 See Victoria Laundry, UCC, and Restatement. 
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default rule of limited liability forces one party to reveal information 
that he or she would rather not disclose. 
A considerable literature has explored a variety of difficulties, 
qualifications, and limitations of this information-forcing rationale 
for a default rule limiting consequential damages. For example, the 
“special circumstances” that a party must disclose before contracting 
may simultaneously reveal important private information about the 
value of the contract to that party.
8 Someone who informs a 
prospective contractual partner that a breach will cause unusually 
large lost profits has also signaled that he or she may be willing to 
pay an unusually high price for performance. Ordinarily, competition 
can be expected to drive the contract asking price down to the cost 
of providing the relevant goods or services plus the cost of bearing 
any  unusual risk  of loss from breach. In imperfectly competitive 
markets, however, these competing strategic considerations 
discourage disclosure and may  diminish the effectiveness of an 
information-forcing rule.
9 
Of course, t he information-forcing  argument for  limited 
consequential damages is but a specific application of a more 
general principle of comparative advantage.
10  Efficiency-minded 
courts and commentators select contract default rules by asking 
which party can more cheaply perform or bear particular risks of 
nonperformance. The information-forcing argument extends this 
basic notion of comparative advantage and considers which party is 
in the best position to disclose information relevant to the 
transaction.  In the context of  consequential damages, it is 
information about factual circumstances such as expected lost 
profits or alternative sources of supply that the rule encourages one 
party to disclose. As we will see in the next section, however, 
information about the legal rules that govern a transaction can also 
be the object of information-forcing rules. 
 
 
8 See Johnston, supra note 4. 
9 See id. at ___. 
10 See Goetz & Scott, Mitigation Principle. 
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B. Information-Forcing Theory Applied to Legal Ignorance 
The hoary maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse” expresses 
a strong presumption that individuals are adequately informed about 
prevailing legal rules.
11 Whether or not that presumption is justified 
in the criminal context from which it arises,  abundant  empirical 
evidence reveals widespread ignorance about many aspects of civil 
law.
12  People often lack basic information about the legal rules 
governing particular transactions in which they are routinely 
involved.  Ignorance about product warranties, termination 
standards, damage limitations, and the like  potentially  distort 
important economic decisions and could produce serious allocative 
inefficiency. 
The argument for information-forcing default rules suggests a 
possible solution to this problem of legal ignorance. We could treat 
legal information just as we do information  about the expected 
consequential damages resulting from a breach of contract. Courts 
or legislatures could determine whether one party has a comparative 
advantage in obtaining and communicating information about the 
prevailing law. If so, an information-forcing rule would force the 
comparatively better informed party either to reveal the relevant 
legal  information or to accept a default rule that favors the less 
informed party. 
A surprisingly large number of common law and statutory rules 
take this form.
13 They seem designed to force a legally sophisticated 
party to inform unsophisticated parties  about the prevailing legal 
standard.  Judicial opinions and legislation often make this 
 
 
11 [cite source] 
12 See Ellickson, supra note 1, [and other sources such as Austin Sarat, 
Support for the Legal System: An Analysis of Knowledge, Attitude and 
Behavior, 3 Am. Pol. Q. 1 (1975) and Michigan Law Review study on legal 
knowledge]. 
13 See infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
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information-forcing objective explicit.
14 For other rules, however, an 
implicit information-forcing rationale is the most plausible 
explanation for their structure.  
All of these rules share two common characteristics. First, they 
are  default rules in the sense that it is possible to provide the 
relevant legal information and thus avoid the unfavorable rule that 
would apply in the absence of this disclosure. Second, the best 
evidence that a rule’s primary purpose is to encourage one party to 
provide legal information to another is the empirical observation that 
the overwhelming majority of legally sophisticated parties choose to 
contract around it. Of course, a court might create such a rule in an 
unsuccessful attempt to identify a majoritarian default.
15 However, a 
more plausible—and more charitable—explanation for default rules 
subject to routine opt-outs is that these rules aim, at least implicitly, 
to increase the amount of legal information contained in this type of 
contract. 
As we saw earlier, the conventional information-forcing 
argument for a default rule limiting consequential damages must 
confront parties’ legitimate strategic  objections to  revealing the 
value of performance to prospective contractual partners.
16 There is, 
however, no basis for arguing that one party to a transaction has a 
right to conceal the prevailing legal rules as legitimately private 
information. Thus, the argument for legal-information-forcing rules 
faces  one less obstacle.  A critic who sought to encourage self-
reliance would perhaps contend that a principle of  caveat emptor 
should  shield parties from any duty to inform  their  contractual 
partners about the law. However, such an argument seeks not to 
conceal the relevant information but  instead to encourage 
uninformed parties to discover it in a different way. An objection on 
these grounds requires  us to compare  alternative means of 
 
 
14 See, e.g., employment contract cases inviting waiver or disclaimers, 
ERISA cases on modifying welfare benefits, UCC rules for disclaiming implied 
warranties. 
15 For discussion of majoritarian default rules, see generally, Goetz & Scott. 
16 See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. 
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conveying legal information but does not call into question the 
advisability of making this information available at all. 
Despite this apparent advantage, a legal-information-forcing rule 
could produce other strategic problems. Sophisticated parties might 
be reluctant to call attention to exculpatory or self-serving rules by 
enshrining them in express contract terms. Potential contractual 
partners—at least those who read the terms before s igning the 
agreement—may interpret such terms as a signal that the contract 
drafter  plans to renege on his or her obligations or otherwise to 
behave in an uncooperative fashion. However, the  informational 
value of such a signal diminishes significantly when the law requires 
or encourages one party to contract expressly for a ny particular 
advantageous term. Indeed, if the practice of contracting around the 
default rule becomes nearly universal—as it is in the overwhelming 
majority of examples discussed below—then this signal no longer 
distinguishes among possible contractual partners.  The danger of 
adverse signaling thus  plays little role in evaluating the costs and 
benefits of legal-information-forcing default rules. 
C. Some Examples 
As we have seen, the basic theoretical argument for information-
forcing rules extends quite readily to rules designed to encourage 
parties to disclose legal information. It should perhaps be 
unsurprising that courts and legislatures frequently adopt contract 
default rules for the apparent purpose of dispelling legal ignorance. 
Consider first the legal rules that determine the terms governing 
discharge from employment. Although the default rule in all but one 
U.S. jurisdiction is employment at-will,
17 the willingness of courts to 
enforce implied agreements for just-cause protection strongly 
encourages employers to contract expressly for an at-will 
relationship.
18 In fact, many  judicial  decisions expressly invite 
employers to contract around the courts’ liberal construction of 
 
 
17 [cite source] 
18 See Verkerke, supra note ___, at ___. 
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employee handbooks and other informal assurances.
19  Moreover, 
most courts appear willing, even eager, to enforce express at-will 
terms so long as they are phrased clearly and positioned prominently 
among they documents presented to new employees at the time of 
hiring.
20 These doctrines thus  satisfy the first requirement for 
information-forcing rules—they are default rules subject to opt-out. 
They satisfy the second criterion as well. Empirical evidence of 
employment contract practices confirms that the majority of legally 
sophisticated parties contract expressly for an at-will relationship. 
Most employers, and especially larger more sophisticated firms, use 
written  confirmations of at-will status.
21  Because the prevailing 
default rule is employment-at-will, these express terms are formally 
superfluous. Nevertheless, such  provisions have practical value 
because they tend to inoculate employers against implied contract 
claims.  The express terms ordinarily take precedence over 
arguments that written and oral statements can be understood to 
imply a commitment to provide just-cause protection to employees. 
Implied contract doctrine thus serves a legal-information-forcing 
function. Courts reason that employers should be bound to a just-
cause contract whenever assurances or policies concerning job 
security would lead a reasonable employee to believe that he had 
some protection against arbitrary discharge.  Just as readily, 
however, they enforce formal disclaimers and confirmations of at-
will status contained in employee handbooks and on separate forms 
signed at hiring. Judges  assert that employees who have read or 
signed such statements must now understand their unprotected legal 
status.
22 By opting out of the implied contract doctrine, employers 
have thus provided what courts evidently consider valuable legal 
information. Workers presumably learn the true nature of the legal 
terms governing discharge from employment. 
 
 
19 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield; Wooley v. Hoffman La 
Roche. 
20 See, e.g., [case example]. 
21 See Verkerke, supra note ___, at  ___. 
22 [Quotes from Wooley; Rowe v. Montgomery Ward; Tousaint; others] 
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ERISA case law similarly includes numerous instances in which 
a plan sponsor must include specific contract language in order to 
avoid an unfavorable construction of its benefit plan. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in  Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch,
23  for 
example, attaches talismanic significance to highly specific terms 
found in the formal plan. The Court opines that if, and only if, the 
employer includes language giving the plan administrator 
discretionary authority to interpret and construe the plan, then the 
administrator’s decisions to deny benefits should be reviewed using 
a deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard. However, if the 
magical language is not present, then courts are to conduct a de 
novo review of all benefit denials. Predictably, employers have 
responded to this ruling by amending their plans to include this 
language.  
In this case, the Court never specifically invokes an information-
forcing rationale for its rule.
24 Instead, Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
relies on formal doctrinal rules from the law of trusts. Although this 
formal doctrinal analysis has been subject to withering criticism,
25 an 
alternative justification for the Court’s ruling is that plan participants 
and beneficiaries should have some way of knowing what standard 
of review will apply to their disputes with plan administrators. The 
language required by Firestone thus might alert individuals that their 
plan administrator has significant discretion over benefit payments. 
The rule establishing de novo review as the default clearly permits 
opt-outs, and virtually every plan now expressly grants the 
administrator discretionary authority to interpret and construe the 
terms of the plan. In functional terms, the Firestone rule appears to 
be a pure legal-information-forcing rule. 
Other ERISA rules reveal a similar pattern. In some circuits at 
least, a default rule restricts a plan sponsor’s right to make unilateral 
changes to the terms of the plan. However, plans routinely include 
 
 
23 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
24 [check carefully to make certain of this point] 
25 See Langbein, Flunks Trusts. 
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express language permitting amendment or termination of the plan.
26 
The default rule thus has no practical effect other than inducing plan 
sponsors to provide information about the legal rule governing plan 
modifications.  
At a more pedestrian level, lower court cases interpreting 
ERISA’s requirement of a summary plan description (SPD) impose 
several contradictory standards that are curiously unified by their 
confident reliance on the informative value of express contract 
terms. Cases falling at one end of the spectrum require employers to 
include in the  SPD extremely specific legal facts concerning the 
circumstances that might lead to a benefit denial.
27  Employers who 
fail to provide this legal information risk having to pay benefits to 
participants to which they would not be entitled under the terms of 
the formal plan. In contrast, other cases give employers much wider 
latitude to omit information from the SPD so long as the SPD 
includes an express disclaimer directing beneficiaries to consult the 
formal plan documents to determine their rights and obligations.
28 In 
both of these cases, the default rule formally favors employees but 
seems designed solely to induce employers to include certain legal 
information in their SPD. Once again, the universal practice of plan 
sponsors  is to opt out of the default by  providing the required 
information. 
Legal-information-forcing rules are equally common outside of 
the employment context. Recall, for example, your last skydiving or 
hang-gliding lesson. Or think about the documents you signed 
before participating in a whitewater rafting adventure or when you 
registered your child to play soccer or lacrosse. In each of these 
cases, the activity sponsor  faces potential tort liability for any 
negligently caused injuries to participants. However,  courts 
 
 
26 See Sprague v. General Motors (enforcing right to modify despite 
seemingly contradictory language in many plan summaries). 
27 See, e.g., Ruotolo v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 622 F. Supp. 546 (1985); 
Zittrouer v. Uarco Inc. Group Benefit Plan, 582 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
28 See Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 F.2d 949 (7
th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1032 (1987). 
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routinely give effect to prospective waivers of liability for ordinary 
negligence.
29  The barrage of exculpatory clauses that greet 
participants in these activities is the  predictable consequence of 
these rules. Such waivers have the practical effect of converting the 
ostensibly mandatory tort rule into an information-forcing default. 
Similarly, t he UCC contemplates—and product manufacturers 
routinely invoke—an  express formula for disclaiming the Code’s 
default warranty of merchantability and limiting consequential 
damages.
30 Credit card agreements include a variety of exculpatory 
clauses designed to protect the credit card issuer from liability for its 
refusal to authorize a particular credit transaction.
31 Contracts for 
services such as car rental agreements contain a host of clauses that 
place responsibility for certain losses on the rental customer and 
excuse the rental company from liability.
32 Computer software end-
user license agreements (EULA) include comprehensive disclaimers 
of virtually every form of liability that might be i mposed on the 
software publisher and strictly limit the purchaser to the remedy of 
replacing defective disks.
33 Software downloaded from the Web 
similarly requires prior consent to a “click-wrap” license that 
contains the familiar litany of exculpatory clauses.
34 Finally, online 
communities and Web-based services demand that participants agree 
to an exhaustive list of liability limitations and service restrictions.
35 
The common thread that runs through all of these examples is 
that sophisticated contracting parties respond to rules favoring their 
contractual partners by adopting express terms that shift the balance 
of legal rights in their own favor. Naïve default rule analysis would 
 
 
29 A few states, including Virginia, refuse to enforce prospective waivers for 
team sports. Most other states distinguish ordinary from gross negligence. 
Waivers protect against liability for ordinary negligence but remain ineffective 
against gross negligence. 
30 See [UCC §§ 2-316, 2-719]. 
31 See [example from case]. 
32 See [example]. 
33 See [find sample license]. 
34 See [example of Microsoft Windows Update]. 
35 See [example of AnyDay.com]. 
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criticize these  doctrines  for generating unnecessary transaction 
costs.  On this view, the rules cause wasteful efforts to draft 
disclaimers, liability limitations, and other exculpatory clauses that 
appear in virtually every contract. The theory of information-forcing 
defaults provides an alternative, more constructive role for these 
doctrines. According to this perspective, the routine practice of 
contracting around such rules conveys valuable legal information to 
comparatively unsophisticated parties.  It remains to be seen, 
however, how well express contract terms serve that function. 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH INFORMATION-FORCING JUSTIFICATIONS 
In this Part, I identify a significant practical problem with legal-
information-forcing rules that allows legal ignorance to persist even 
in the face of fully informative express contract terms. Scholars, and 
to a lesser extent judges, have considered this problem, but their 
analysis does little to clarify the appropriate scope or design of these 
rules. One possible response to these shortcomings  would be  to 
design more effective ways to convey legal information to 
unsophisticated parties. I argue, however, that we currently  lack 
essential empirical facts about how people obtain and process legal 
information. 
A. The Persistence of Legal Ignorance 
As the previous section demonstrated, we receive an 
extraordinary quantity of legal information in our ordinary lives as 
employees and consumers. In light of the ubiquity of express 
contract terms, it is nothing short of remarkable how little we seem 
to know about the law governing our diverse transactions. But a 
moment’s introspection  reveals  a  straightforward e xplanation for 
this divergence between  the quantity of  information provided and 
level of legal understanding achieved. A major premise underlying 
the argument for legal-information-forcing rules is almost certainly 
false. To put the matter most simply, people most often ignore the 
text of written contracts. Almost no one reads contracts carefully 
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enough to digest the legal information that these default rules are 
designed to force.
36 Thus, i f the purpose of these doctrines is to 
convey legal information to all, or even many, unsophisticated 
parties, that objective is likely to be frustrated. 
B. Judicial and Scholarly Perspectives on Legal Ignorance 
Several strands of the scholarly literature bear some relation to 
the problems we have been considering. First, a substantial body of 
work explores the potential benefits of imposing legal disclosure 
requirements in various transactional settings. For example, federal 
law requires lenders to disclose repayment  terms and annual 
percentage rates in a standardized format.
37 Similarly, food and drug 
law requires product labels to include ingredient lists and nutritional 
information.
38 And securities law mandates that issuers publish a 
comprehensive prospectus describing any new offering in 
excruciating detail.
39 
Considerable effort has gone into evaluating the success or 
failure of particular disclosure obligations. An early article by 
William Whitford, for example, reviews studies of how truth-in-
lending  laws affect consumer knowledge of credit terms.
40  More 
recently,  commentators  have  argued that excessive disclosure 
requirements create a danger of information overload.
41 Still other 
work relies on experimental studies of consumer behavior to 
challenge the information-overload hypothesis.
42 These papers show 
that consumer search strategies readily adapt to the presence of too 
 
 
36 See [Michigan survey; plain language study]. 
37 See [Truth in Lending statements required by FTC]. 
38 See [FDA regs}. 
39 See [SEC regs]. 
40 William C.  Whitford,  The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in 
Consumer Transactions, 1973 WISC. L. REV. 400. 
41 See [sources cited in Schwartz & Wilde]. 
42 David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of 
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 277 (1986)). 
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much information by simply ignoring the excess. As a result, 
excessive disclosure may well be worthless, but it does not cause 
consumers to make poor choices as a result of an “overload” of 
information.
43 
This disclosure literature may provide useful insights into 
consumers’ information processing techniques. However, disclosure 
regulations and information-forcing defaults differ in important 
respects. The sanction for violating disclosure rules is typically a 
civil or criminal penalty of some kind. In contrast, a party who fails 
to provide the information targeted by an information-forcing 
default must carry out the transaction under an unfavorable legal 
rule.  The most appropriate remedy for excessive disclosure 
regulations is simply to eliminate the unproductive requirements. 
Fixing a malfunctioning information-forcing default requires a 
lawmaker to determine an appropriate legal rule to govern the 
transaction in question. Finally, disclosure regulations often specify 
with great precision what and how parties must make required 
disclosures. Information-forcing defaults are ordinarily cast in more 
general terms and leave much to the discretion of the disclosing 
party.
44 This lack of standardization significantly complicates the 
task of evaluating the effectiveness of a legal-information-forcing 
default rule. 
One salient fact about legal-information-forcing rules is that the 
targeted information is most often communicated in a standardized 
form contract such as a bill of sale, an employee handbook,  a 
standard form insurance contract, a release of liability, or a rental 
agreement. An important strand of contracts scholarship examines 
the problems associated with enforcing  such standard  form 
agreements, which are typically offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Often referred to as contracts of adhesion, these form contracts have 
 
 
43 Id. at ___. 
44 See, e.g., [example of employment contract disclaimers and 
confirmations of at-will status]. 
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been the subject of frequent academic criticism.
45 Although judges 
express  occasional  misgivings about enforcing form contracts, 
courts have largely ignored the most extreme academic critics who 
would, for example, create a presumption against enforceability.
46 
Instead, prevailing law enforces unfavorable form contract terms 
against unsophisticated parties so long as they meet minimal 
standards of procedural fairness.
47  Judges appear to assume 
implicitly that adhering parties are either adequately informed about 
the terms of their agreement or that a competitive market provides 
sufficient protection against fundamentally unfair agreements.
48 On 
those few occasions that courts refuse enforcement they invariably 
find that a particular clause is both substantively oppressive and that 
the process of agreement was flawed in some way.
49 
No similar problems afflict the express terms that are the subject 
of this article. Although the terms with which we are concerned 
almost always appear in standard form contracts, few if any of them 
are even arguably  unconscionable. Indeed,  numerous  judicial 
decisions invite employers or other sophisticated parties to contract 
expressly to avoid the unfavorable consequences of the default 
rule.
50 It would be utterly incongruous to invite parties to contract 
around an information-forcing default rule only to rule subsequently 
that those very terms were unconscionable. Moreover, courts have 
shown little sympathy for litigants who claim not to have read or 
understood provisions of  the legal  documents they have signed.
51 
The  “duty to read” doctrine creates a virtually irrebuttable 
 
 
45 See Friedrich Kessler,  Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About 
Freedom of Contract, 43  COLUM.  L.  REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, 
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 
(1983). 
46 See Rakoff, supra note ___, at ___. 
47 See [citation]. 
48 See, e.g., [case examples of both arguments]. 
49 See [California unconscionability doctrine]. 
50 See [handbook cases, ERISA cases, insurance cases, UCC warranty 
doctrine]. 
51 See [duty to read cases]. 
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presumption that a person  is fully aware of the contents of any 
writing that he or she has signed.
52 With the exception of cases 
involving potential fraud or misrepresentation, courts  thus stand 
ready to enforce the express contract terms that legal-information-
forcing rules cause sophisticated parties to include in their 
agreements. 
Recent academic commentary lauds the potential utility of legal-
information-forcing default rules. My own prior work on 
employment contract practices first suggested an information-
forcing rationale for rules that liberally construe informal assurances 
of job security against employers.
53 In a more recent article, Cass 
Sunstein has embraced the information-forcing theory as a general 
argument for switching default rules to f avor employees.
54  One 
common characteristic of all c onventional information-forcing 
arguments  is that they rely on an assumption that  the  targeted 
information will be received and understood.  
Despite the myriad information-forcing default rules currently in 
effect, however, legal ignorance persists. Existing doctrines cause 
contracts to include copious quantities of legal information. 
However,  neither courts nor commentators appear to have given 
much thought to the question of whether these express terms serve 
their ostensible purpose of informing parties about the legal rules 
governing the transaction. Thus o ne possible response to the 
persistence of legal ignorance would be to improve the quality of 
existing legal disclosures.  Lawmakers might try to design 
information-forcing rules that induce sophisticated parties to provide 
legal information  in a manner that is more likely  to be read and 
understood. The next section reviews the surprisingly sparse 
research available on this issue and speculates about the feasibility of 
perfecting the informative function of information-forcing rules. 
 
 
52 For a typical application of this doctrine, see Reid v. Sears Roebuck. 
53 See Verkerke, supra note ___, at ___. 
54 Cass Sunstein, Switching Default Rules. 
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C. Designing Effective Express Contract Terms 
In light of the ubiquity of legal-information-forcing default rules, 
one would expect to find substantial research investigating how to 
make those rules most effective. In fact, only a few scholars have 
produced work that bears on this issue. 
[Discuss plain language movement for form contracts.] 
A survey  of unemployment insurance applicants conducted by 
Pauline Kim  provides suggestive evidence that individuals’ beliefs 
about job security are unresponsive to commonly used 
confirmations of at-will status.
55 One problem with her survey 
design is that she asked subjects about specific scenarios before 
introducing the at-will language and then asking the same subjects 
about the same scenarios. A conditioning effect could explain why 
subjects answered the same questions in the same way the second 
time around. A better experimental design would have used separate 
treatment and control groups  to determine the effect of at-will 
language on subjects’ beliefs about job security. 
More recent work by Jesse Rudy improves on Kim’s study by 
surveying employed individuals rather than those who have recently 
lost their jobs.
56 Rudy largely confirms Kim’s  findings about 
workers’ tendency to overestimate the legal protections against 
discharge that they enjoy. Because he chose to administer a survey 
instrument identical to the one Kim employed, his replication of her 
results showing the ineffectiveness of at-will language is subject to 
the same criticism. Nevertheless, these results are currently the best 
available evidence that legal-information-forcing rules relating to 
employment termination may fail to inform workers about the law. 
 
 
55 Pauline Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 
(1997). 
56 Jesse Rudy,  What The Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending 
Employment-At-Will in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess 
Just Cause Protection, 23 BERK. J. EMPLOY. & LAB. L. 307 (2002). 
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As Jesse Rudy suggests, workers  might  well be rationally 
ignorant about the legal terms governing employment termination.
57 
The expected cost of acquiring this legal knowledge may exceed the 
expected benefit that such knowledge could confer. Perhaps there 
exists no feasible method of communicating contract terms that 
would  inform workers  about  the prevailing legal rule governing 
discharge. 
If this speculation is correct, we must entertain the possibility 
that for some legal rules the broad information-forcing objective is 
futile. It may be simply impossible to design legal requirements for 
contracting out of  these rules that  will allow the majority of 
unsophisticated parties to receive and process the relevant 
information. Kim’s and Rudy’s work hints that this may be true for 
terms governing discharge from employment.  We  might expect 
similar problems to arise in  other legally  complex areas such as 
ERISA benefits, warranty disclaimers, damage limitations, and 
insurance contracts. 
III. ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES FOR INFORMATION-FORCING RULES  
We have seen that legal-information-forcing rules may well fail 
to inform the majority of unsophisticated people about the legal 
rules governing their transactions. Accordingly, it is important to 
explore alternative purposes that such rules might serve. This part 
examines three possibilities. First, the express terms that result from 
information-forcing default rules might improve the accessibility of 
legal information for a small minority of  diligent comparison 
shoppers.  Second, t hose terms could  facilitate  ex post dispute 
resolution by providing a clear statement of the legal rules governing 
each transaction. Finally, we might understand exculpatory contract 
language as an effort to opt out of the comparatively expensive legal 
system in favor of an alternative regime of rights and obligations 
enforced solely by informal social norms. 
 
 
57 Id. at ___. 
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A. Inform Comparison Shoppers 
The conventional understanding of information-forcing rules 
dictates that the resulting communications should inform all, or at 
least most, of the uninformed parties about the targeted information. 
Even if most people ignore the terms of written contracts that they 
sign, however, it is nevertheless possible that those terms provide 
valuable information to a smaller group of parties. Express contract 
terms significantly lower the cost of information for avid comparison 
shoppers who are willing to invest in learning the legal details 
surrounding a transaction. 
An often-cited article by Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde argues 
that competition  among p roducers  to serve well-informed 
comparison shoppers provides benefits to all other consumers.
58 
Legal-information-forcing  defaults ensure that critical information 
about the legal rules governing each transaction is readily accessible 
in the written documents for that transaction. On this interpretation, 
the default rule facilitates comparison shopping. The activities of 
comparison shoppers in turn promote allocative efficiency by 
scrutinizing the proffered terms and exerting some pressure on 
employers, manufacturers, and service providers to offer a more 
balanced and reasonable set of terms than they would otherwise be 
inclined to draft.
59 
One significant weakness of the comparison shopping rationale 
is that it depends on the availability of diverse choices in the relevant 
marketplace. If all sellers or employers offer an identical package of 
express contract terms, then comparison shoppers can expect no 
benefit from their investment in legal knowledge. In these 
circumstances, it seems doubtful that any individuals will bother to 
acquire the legal information that these express terms convey. For 
example, standard form insurance contracts vary so little among 
 
 
58 Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 
(1979). 
59 Id. at ___-___. 
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insurers that even avid comparison shoppers might rationally focus 
their search exclusively on variable  parameters such as price and 
coverage limits. 
A second related problem with this justification for information-
forcing rules is that individual consumers or workers may face too 
few choices to make comparison shopping worthwhile. In 
recessionary times, workers often feel compelled to accept the first 
job offer  that  they receive. Uncertainty about their chances of 
receiving a competing offer coupled with the financial and emotional 
stress associated with continued unemployment sometimes rules out 
shopping behavior on the part of job seekers. Similarly, 
transportation costs or other factors creating a local monopoly 
could  make consumer choices equally constrained.  In these 
circumstances, the goal of informing comparison shoppers falls short 
of justifying the use of information-forcing default rules. 
B. Ex Post Legal Clarity 
Alternatively, express terms may be desirable not because they 
inform people about the prevailing legal rule  ex ante but instead 
because they make the rules clear ex post. Greater clarity ex post 
reduces the cost and uncertainty  surrounding  both settlement 
negotiations and adjudication.  On this account, legal-information-
forcing rules provide no direct benefit for the unsophisticated parties 
to whom the resulting express contract terms are proffered. These 
parties benefit only indirectly from the fact that expected litigation 
costs are reduced by the clarity those terms provide. One can easily 
imagine that over-burdened courts might also be sympathetic to 
contract practices that facilitate settlement or summary disposition 
of potential legal disputes. Express terms preclude some litigation 
entirely by specifying the parties’ legal rights, or lack of legal rights, 
clearly and precisely. For cases that find their way into the judicial 
system, those same terms give judges grounds to dismiss complaints 
or grant summary judgment whenever the express terms resolve the 
dispute. 
One  bit of evidence tends to  confirm  the  relevance  of this 
rationale. Legal-information-forcing rules most often apply to 
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repeated transactions such as employment, credit, or product sales. 
In settings such as these, sophisticated parties can amortize  over 
many transactions the costs of developing a standardized agreement 
containing the necessary express contract terms. Legal-information-
forcing rules are less common for unique transactions of the same 
underlying value. Single-shot transactions—such as private sales of 
used cars or hiring casual employees for domestic work—rarely 
warrant  significant investments in express contracting.  In  these 
situations, it makes economic sense to rely more heavily on court-
provided default terms.  The greater judicial tendency to adopt 
information-forcing rules for repeated transactions is thus broadly 
consistent with the goal of clarifying the prevailing terms ex post. 
Nevertheless, courts often seem to make contract interpretation 
more complicated  and uncertain  than absolutely necessary.
60 
Additional social goals such as substantive or procedural fairness 
thus must qualify the objective of ex post legal clarity. Moreover, an 
account of information-forcing rules ideally should incorporate a 
plausible account of  what motivates the behavior of contracting 
parties. Focusing too much on judicial objectives could distort our 
picture of the role that express terms play in the relations between 
contracting parties. 
C. Opting for Norms Rather Than Law  
A third rationale for express contract terms focuses on informal 
alternatives to the legal system. Under this approach, a thoroughly 
exculpatory express contract simply confers legal discretion on the 
sophisticated party to administer a norms-based claims settlement 
procedure without undue interference from the more costly and 
cumbersome legal system.  Information-forcing default rules 
effectively allow sophisticated parties to opt out of the legal system. 
In the place of legally enforceable rights, these parties offer their 
contractual partners a system of social norms. To the extent that 
 
 
60 See [UCC stance on contextual evidence, insurance contract cases]. 
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they choose to enforce exculpatory contract language, courts accept 
this substitution of social norms for legal rights. 
Not surprisingly, there are limits to the willingness of courts to 
cede authority over resolving disputes and establishing principles of 
responsibility. On this interpretation, doctrines such as 
unconscionability, duress, and misrepresentation allow courts to 
intervene selectively when they become convinced that a 
sophisticated party has abused its power. Nevertheless,  contract 
drafters retain considerable discretion to preclude employees and 
consumers from resorting to legal processes. Within this broad 
domain, legal-information-forcing rules ironically allow private 
parties to displace legal rights altogether and substitute a  system 
governed primarily by informal social norms. 
Somewhat analogously, arbitration  clauses are designed to 
reduce forum costs.  As compared to the exculpatory clauses we 
have been considering, arbitration preserves more fully parties’ legal 
rights.
61 However, the impulse underlying arbitration clauses closely 
mirrors the goals that sophisticated parties pursue with the 
exculpatory contract terms. For this reason, judicial approaches to 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements closely parallel their 
treatment of the exculpatory clauses we have been considering in 
this section. 
D. Some Policy Implications 
Both common law and statutory rules may usefully encourage 
legally sophisticated parties to inform comparatively unsophisticated 
parties about applicable legal standards.  However, courts and 
legislatures often appear to assume uncritically that unsophisticated 
parties read and understand formal contract provisions.  In fact, 
parties frequently ignore such provisions entirely. 
There are (at least) three defensible responses to this empirical 
fact (for those situations in which it can be firmly established that 
most parties ignore express terms.). 
 
 
61 See, e.g., Mitsubishi (forum selection argument) 
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First, courts can shape  these  doctrines to make information-
forcing rules more effective. Further empirical evidence could reveal 
which doctrinal innovations hold the greatest promise for better 
informing unsophisticated parties.  Case law has thus far sought 
principally  to promote greater prominence and clarity of express 
contract terms in the apparent belief that these characteristics will 
make such terms more informative.  
There is, however, absolutely no empirical basis for determining 
what will work.  Contemporary scholars such as Cass Sunstein 
somewhat blithely assume that some combination of express terms 
and disclosures will convey the targeted information.  However, 
introspection and casual empiricism suggest that many—perhaps 
most—of these clauses go unread.  If the problem is that no one 
reads contracts, then  an effective doctrine would have to require 
parties to read agreements before signing. If, however, lay people 
are unable to understand agreements even after reading them, then 
courts might need to require the participation of an attorney when 
contracts are formed.  
The enormous costs associated with these approaches should 
make us cautious to embrace them. If, for example, efficiency only 
requires that avid comparison shoppers read written agreements, 
then it would be extremely wasteful to impose costly duties that 
apply to every transaction. However, if the social goal is to affect 
each individual’s beliefs and behavior, then lawmakers should 
develop some firm empirical basis for believing that particular forms 
of regulation will be effective. 
Alternatively,  courts could abandon the pretense that formal 
terms inform unsophisticated parties and embrace a new rationale 
for these requirements.  Perhaps unsophisticated parties are 
rationally ignorant about express contract terms. The cost of reading 
and understanding contractual terms may exceed the expected value 
of being better informed about the prevailing law. Parties thus may 
prefer to rely on informal mechanisms of contract enforcement. If 
so, then efforts to force them to become aware  of the terms 
governing each transaction are socially wasteful. 
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Courts  might  nevertheless encourage sophisticated parties to 
draft  express terms when  that practice  makes sense for other 
reasons.  For example,  comprehensive express terms  could  make 
legal rules clear  ex post. Such an objective implies very different 
priorities for regulating the content of contracts. We would worry 
far less about prominence and the c ontracting process and focus 
almost exclusively on requiring clarity  in the terms themselves in 
order to eliminate any possible ambiguity.  
Of course, if no persuasive argument exists for continuing to 
encourage  express terms, courts  should perhaps abandon legal-
information-forcing rules entirely. One final possibility is that courts 
may be unwilling to express the true justification for these rules. For 
example, it may be difficult for a court to acknowledge that most 
people derive no benefit from knowing the express terms of their 
agreements.  Thus, the deep justification for these rules might be 
some combination of the alternative rationales I have explored in 
this part. Nevertheless, courts continue to rely on the legal fiction 
that express terms are truly informative. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that a surprisingly broad range of 
contract default rules have the ostensible purpose of inducing 
sophisticated parties to draft express contract language that will 
inform their contractual partners about the legal rules governing a 
particular transaction. I have also suggested that this legal-
information-forcing objective often founders because people sign 
contracts without reading and understanding their terms. It is 
theoretically possible that courts could design information-forcing 
rules that would be truly informative. However, we currently lack 
adequate empirical data about how people process legal information 
to be able to fashion such rules with any confidence. 
Recognizing the potential futility o f attempts to inform most 
contracting parties about complex legal rules, I have also explored 
several alternative justifications for doctrines that encourage 
sophisticated parties to draft express contract terms. Such terms 
facilitate the activities of avid comparison shoppers. Comprehensive 
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written terms also promote ex post legal clarity and thereby reduce 
the costs of resolving disputes. Finally, a litany of exculpatory 
clauses effectively allows parties to contract out of the 
comparatively expensive legal system of dispute resolution in favor 
of a regime governed by informal social norms. 
Each of these rationales for express contract terms contains 
more than a grain of truth.  Existing practices seem broadly 
consistent with the view that all three operate to some extent in the 
current legal environment. Perhaps the most accurate descriptive 
story is that an uncertain amalgam of these various objectives 
motivates the widespread use of legal-information-forcing rules. The 
normative desirability of these rules is somewhat less clear, but my 
exploration of alternative justifications shows the conceptual 
poverty of current judicial and legislative reliance on the informative 
content of express contract terms. Any successful defense of the 
existing regime must necessarily venture beyond the conventional 
understanding of information-forcing rules. 
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